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Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.
I. MASTROBUONO v. SHEAPSON LEHMAN HUTTON, INC.-THE FACTS
On March 6, 1995, in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,' the
United States Supreme Court resolved a conflict among federal circuit courts by
upholding an arbitrator's power to award punitive damages when a brokerage
agreement contains a New York choice-of-law clause. A New York choice-of-
law clause is important" because New York law allows only courts, not
arbitrators, to award punitive damages. This restriction on an arbitrator's power
to award punitive damages is known as the Garrity Rule.' Many brokerage
finns, including Shearson Lehman, are based in New York and have New York
choice-of-law clauses in their brokerage agreements.
Antonio and Diana Mastrobuono opened a securities trading account with
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. by executing Shearson's standard-form Client's
Agreement. The Mastrobuonos closed the account after two years and filed suit,
claiming Shearson had mishandled their account. Damages were claimed under
various state and federal law theories. The claim specifically alleged "churning,"
a claim which rests on the theory that the broker caused securities in the client's
account to be traded with a frequency or amount too great in light of the client's
needs and the nature and size of the client's account. Churning would have
resulted in higher commissions to Shearson.3 The client agreement contained
an arbitration provision and a New York choice-of-law provision.4 After suit
was filed in federal district court, Shearson filed a motion to stay the court
Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
2. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 796 (1976). The Garrity court held that
arbitrators have no power to award punitive damages even if the arbitration agreement specifically
provides for such a remedy. The court reasoned that allowing an arbitrator to award punitive
damages would encroach upon the functions of the court and jury and displace the State as the
"engine for imposing a social sanction."
3. Michael S. Wilson, Punitive Damages in the Arbitration of Securities Churning Cases, 1
Rev. Litig. 137, 139 (1991).
4. Id. at 1216. Paragraph 13 of the Client's Agreement provided:
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of your [Shearson's] successors and assigns[,]
shall be binding on the undersigned, my [petitioners'] heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns, and shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York. Unless unenforce-
able due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to [my]
accounts, to transactions with you, your officers, directors, agents and/or employees for
me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance
with the rules then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the
Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock
Exchange Inc. as I may elect.
Id. at 1216-17 n.2.
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proceedings and to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. §§ 3' and 4.6 The court
granted the motion, and the Mastrobuonos brought their claims before the
National Association of Security Dealers (NASD). The arbitration panel awarded
punitive damages in the amount of $400,000 and compensatory damages in the
amount of $159,327.' The district court vacated the award because the contract
contained a New York choice-of-law provision, and thus, the contract was
governed by the Garrity Rule.8 The district court relied on Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Universit? and
held that the "liberal policy favoring arbitration did not provide any basis for
ignoring choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements."'0  The district
court reasoned that under New York law, imposition of punitive damages is a
power reserved to the state and its courts and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
does not preempt a New York choice-of-law provision." The decision was
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which reasoned that the
parties, by agreeing to arbitrate all of the controversies under New York law
without excluding the arbitration rules, had adopted the Garrity Rule as binding
on their contract. 2 The Seventh Circuit concluded that while the FAA requires
courts to favor arbitration, this federal policy does not stand for "arbitration per
se" and would not preclude enforcement of an agreement not to arbitrate certain
claims. 3
The United States Supreme Court reversed the district and appellate courts.
The main issue before the Court was whether the arbitrators' award of punitive
damages was consistent with the central purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act
to ensure "that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their
terms."'4  Held: If contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive
5. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1925) states in relevant part:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which suit is pending... shall... stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement ....
6. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1925) states in relevant part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure ... of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any court of the United States which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in such agreement ....
7. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1215.
8. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. 11. 1993), afd,
20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994), and rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
9. 489 U.S. 468, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989) (discussed infra part I).
10. Mastrobuono, 812 F. Supp. at 847.
11. Id. at 847.
12. 20 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
13. 20 F.3d at 719; see also infra part II.
14. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1213 (1995) (quoting Volt
Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109
S. Ct. 1248, 1255-56 (1989)).
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damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement
will be enforced according to its terms even if a state law rule would otherwise
exclude such claims from arbitration.'s
II. THE LAW PRIOR To MASTROBUONO
A. Introduction
Arbitration, a form of alternative dispute resolution, is increasingly common
in today's fast-paced commercial world. Arbitration is faster and more efficient
than the overcrowded traditional judicial tribunals. It has become especially
important in the investment business as arbitration clauses are standard in client
agreements. Arbitration is a matter of contract and both parties to a dispute must
agree to submit to it. Courts look at the arbitration agreement to determine the
scope of arbitration. Few arbitration agreements expressly contemplate punitive
damages.16 Therefore, most courts look first to the whole of the arbitration
agreement for clues as to the parties' intent and, second, to the rules of the
arbitration forum. While only two percent of claims submitted to arbitration
result in punitive damages,' punitive damage awards can result in a substantial
increase in the cost of litigation. Therefore, many brokerage firms are concerned
with the current trend favoring these awards.
This note will focus on the Court's analysis in Mastrobuono. This note will
also focus on the legislative and judicial history of arbitration, the Federal
Arbitration Act and securities agreements with arbitration clauses. In conclusion,
this note will analyze the current problems posed by Mastrobuono and recent
developments in securities law.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
The United States Supreme Court cases of the 1980s concerning securities
arbitration are based in large part on the Federal Arbitration Act.'" Section 2
of the Act provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
15. Id. at 1219.
16. Carroll E. Neeseman & Maren E. Nelson, Damages, in Securities Arbitration 1995, at 417
(PLI No. 900, 1995).
17. Punitive Award Survey, Sec. Arb. Commentator, May 1993, at 1, 7.
18. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1925).
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enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."
The legislative intent behind the FAA is to place an arbitration agreement "upon
the same footing as other contracts."20 The Act was considered necessary by
Congress because courts were hostile toward the concept of alternative forms of
dispute resolution. The House Report accompanying the bill for the Federal
Arbitration Act states:
The need for the law arises from... the jealousy of the English courts
for their own jurisdiction .... This jealousy survived for so Ion [sic]
a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English
common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be
overturned without legislative enactment. .....
Most of the issues faced by the Supreme Court concerning arbitration after the
enactment of the FAA have involved the scope of the Act. Also at issue has
been the power of the states and the contracting parties to limit and expand
controversies under arbitration.
C. The Supreme Court Decisions
To understand the significance of the Mastrobuono decision, it is first
necessary to review the Supreme Court cases decided since the enactment of the
FAA. The cases build upon each other. Therefore, this note will examine these
cases chronologically.
The first case, Wilko v. Swan,' interpreted the FAA narrowly. The Court
in Wilko held the right to a judicial forum provided by the Securities Act of 1933
cannot validly be waived through a predispute arbitration agreement.' The
Court recognized that the general purpose of the FAA is to give arbitration
participants an opportunity to secure prompt, economical and adequate solutions
of controversies through arbitration "if the parties are willing to accept less
certainty of legally correct adjustment,"'24 but saw a conflict between the
arbitration clause in the contract and a Securities Act provision that nullified
contractual waivers of Securities Act rights. The Court held that rights to a
judicial forum were among the rights that could not be waived. The Court
explained:
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925) (emphasis added).
20. H.1L Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
21. Id.
22. 346 U.S. 427, 438, 74 S. Ct. 182, 188 (1953).
23. Id. at 435, 74 S. Ct. at 186.
24. Id. at 438, 74 S. Ct. at 188 (emphasis added).
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When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act,
waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a
participant in other business transactions. The security buyer has a
wider choice of courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the
advantages the Act gives him and surrenders it at a time when he is less
able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon
his adversary. '
The Court concluded that while predispute arbitration agreements may provide
advantages such as efficiency, the intention of Congress concerning the sale of
securities was better served by holding invalid a predispute agreement compelling
arbitration.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.'s
marked the beginning of a much broader reading of the FAA. In Moses, the
Court held:
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability."
The Court stated the FAA established a" federal substantive law" of arbitrability
under § 2 of the FAA."8 The Court saw Section 2 as a strong indication of
Congress' intent to foster a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." The
Court held the FAA applies to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of
the act.3" This holding was the Court's first pronouncement that state courts
should follow the FAA.
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,31 the Court held the FAA went further than
declaring a national policy favoring arbitration and actually withdrew the states'
power to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims if the contracting
parties had agreed to arbitration. A provision of the California Franchise
Investment Law,33 invalidating certain arbitration agreements covered by the
25. Id. at 435, 74 S. Ct. at 187.
26. 460 U.S. 1, 103 S. CL 927 (1983).
27. Id. at 24-25, 103 S. Ct. at 941.
28. Id. at 24, 103 S. Ct. at 941.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 24, 103 S. CL at 941.
31. 465 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
32. Id.
33. Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 (West 1977) states: "[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision
purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this
law or any rule or order hereunder is void."
19961 1019
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FAA, was held to violate the Supremacy Clause because the FAA embodied
substantive federal law applicable in state as well as federal courts. According
to Southland, Congress intended the FAA to foreclose state legislative attempts
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 4 Justice O'Connor
argued in her dissent that the FAA is only a matter of federal procedural law."
However, her view was (and still is) in the minority. By the end of the 1980s,
it was well established that the FAA contained federal substantive law which
preempted any conflicting state law.
As another example of the Court's willingness to favor arbitration, the Court
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.' held agreements
to arbitrate should be generously construed." A contract clause binding the
parties to settle all disputes through arbitration conducted according to rules
which allow any form of just and equitable remedy of relief is sufficiently broad
enough to encompass the awarding of punitive damages.3" The Court reasoned,
"[bjy agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."39
The Supreme Court distinguished the Wilko Court's reluctance to enforce
arbitration agreements in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.' The
Court made it clear that federal securities claims may be arbitrated and that
arbitration is the favored method for resolving these disputes. The McMahon
court approved arbitration as a means of resolving claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act.4' In distinguishing Wilko, the McMahon Court stated, "the plaintiffs
waiver of the right to select the judicial forum ... was unenforceable only
because arbitration was judged inadequate to enforce the substantive and
statutory rights created by [the Securities Act]. 42  The McMahon Court
reasoned the FAA's mandate that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims be
enforced may be overridden by contrary congressional command. However, the
burden is on the party opposing the arbitration to show that Congress intended
to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for statutory rights at issue. Such intent
is deducible from the statute's text or legislative history or from inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose. 3 The Court searched
the statutes for evidence of Congressional intent to require a judicial forum for
34. 465 U.S at 16, 104 S. Ct. at 861.
35. Id. at 25, 104 S. Ct. at 864 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
36. 473 U.S. 614, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
37. Id. at 626, 105 S. Ct. at 3354.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 628, 105 S. Ct. at 3354.
40. 482 U.S. 220, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 229, 107 S. Ct. at 2338-39.
43. Id. at 227, 107 S. Ct. at 2337-38.
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the resolution of claims but it could not find any such evidence. Therefore, the
Court upheld the arbitration agreement under R.I.C.O. and the Exchange Act.
However, the Court left open the question whether Wilko itself should be
overruled. The Court answered the question in Rodruguez de Quigas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.' In this 5-4 decision, the Court expressly
overruled Wilko v. Swan and held arbitration could be compelled under the
Securities Act just as it could be under R.I.C.O. and the Exchange Act.'
Rodruguez is clear evidence of the United States Supreme Court's current pro-
arbitration policy, and its repudiation of its initial hostility toward the FAA.
The only exception to the pro-arbitration policy of the post-Wilko Supreme
Court cases is Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University." Volt permitted California law'7 to stay an
arbitration proceeding pending resolution of related litigation between a party to
the arbitration agreement and a third party who was not bound to arbitrate. The
Court allowed the anti-arbitration effect of the California law to stand because
the parties to the arbitration agreement had explicitly agreed that California law
would govern their disputes. The Court restated that the principal policy of the
FAA is to enforce private arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms,
including their choice-of-law terms, but concluded there is no federal policy
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules."
Recently, however, the Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson'
returned to a broader reading of the FAA. The Allied-Bruce Court upheld the
enforceability of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement governed by Alabama law,
even though an Alabama statute provided that arbitration agreements were
unenforceable." Many of the state attorney generals asked the Court in Allied-
Bruce to overrule the Southland preemption rule and to allow states to enact anti-
44. 490 U.S. 477, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
45. Id. at 480-81, 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
46. 489 U.S. 468, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
47. The California Arbitration Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2(c) (West 1982) provides in
pertinent part:
[When a court determines that a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a
pending court action... with a third party, arising out of the same transaction ... and
there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact[,] ... the
court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or
joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention
or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who
have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action... pending the outcome of
the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court
action or special proceeding.
(emphasis added).
48. 489 U.S. at 476, 109 S. Ct. at 1254.
49. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
50. Id. at 836; Ala. Code § 8-1-41(3) (1993) makes written, predispute arbitration agreements
invalid and unenforceable.
19961 1021.
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arbitration statutes. The Court refused and concluded that the purpose of the
FAA is to overrule courts' refusals to enforce arbitration agreements.5 1
The question facing the Court was the scope of § 2 of the FAA, specifically
the words "involving commerce." The Court concluded the word "involving" is
broad enough and is indeed the functional equivalent of "affecting" and,
therefore, signals an intent by Congress to exercise Congress' commerce power
to the fullest. 2 In conclusion, the Court stated:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under
general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration
clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." What States may not do is decide that a contract is
fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such
state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration
clauses on an unequal "footing," directly contrary to the Act's language
and Congress's intent. 3
This statement by the Court means that the states cannot restrict parties' ability
to arbitrate except under rules applicable to contracts generally. Therefore, when
parties include an arbitration provision in their contract, the courts cannot strike
the arbitration provision down while upholding the remaining terms merely
because a state law prohibits or restricts arbitration.
Due to the Court's willingness to favor arbitration, many brokerage houses
attempted to find ways to circumvent arbitral punitive damages awards. One
such technique was to use a New York choice-of-law clause. The Garrity
Rule54 had become very common in the client agreements used by most
brokerage firms (including the one in Mastrobuono itself) and appeared to be
enforceable under the ruling in Volt.
D. The Split Among the Courts of Appeals Over Choice-of-Law Provisions
and Punitive Damages
Before the decision in Mastrobuono, the Second and the Seventh Circuits
held that a choice-of-law provision could preclude an arbitral award of punitive
damages that would otherwise be proper. The Second Circuit held the Garrity
Rule barred any award of punitive damages." The Second Circuit relied on
Volt and reasoned that a New York choice-of-law clause in an arbitration
51. Allied-Bruce, 115 S. Ct. at 838.
52. Id. at 841.
53. 115 S. Ct. at 843 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925)) (emphasis in original).
54. See supra note 2.
55. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991); New York, founder
of the Garrity Rule, sits in the Second Circuit.
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agreement is an agreement to incorporate all of New York law, including the
Garrity Rule barring punitive damages, and thus, the arbitration panel is
precluded from awarding punitive damages.' The arbitration agreement in
Barbier was virtually identical to the one in Mastrobuono. The Second Circuit
even held that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction should apply the
Garrity Rule without a choice-of-law clause, unless the parties' agreement
expressly provided for punitive damages." While the Seventh Circuit did not
go quite as far as the Second, the Seventh held that a New York choice-of-law
clause precluded an award of punitive damages."
In contrast to the Second and Seventh Circuits, the majority of the circuits
concluded that choice-of-law provisions did not preclude an otherwise proper
award of punitive damages.59 Those appellate courts reasoned that the
incorporation of a New York choice-of-law clause merely meant the arbitrators
were to use New York substantive law to determine whether the actions would
warrant an award of punitive damages.' The power to award those damages
was deemed procedural and so was not incorporated into a contract with a New
York choice-of-law clause.6' The anti-Garrity courts allowed punitive damages
where the parties had adopted the American Arbitration Association's (AAA)
rules. The courts reasoned that AAA Rule 4362 specifically allowed arbitrators
to award any relief that the arbitrator deemed just and equitable, including an
award of punitive damages.
III. THE CouRT's REASONING IN MASTROBUONO
The majority in Mastrobuono recognized that Congress passed the FAA to
overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate.63 The Court said,
"[i]f contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive damages within the
issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement will be enforced
according to its terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such
56. Id. at 121.
57. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
58. See Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984); Dickinson v.
Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
59. See Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line,
Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys. Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st
Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
60. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386.
61. Id. at 1387.
62. Rule 43 of the American Arbitration Association, Securities Arbitration Rules (1989)
provides the arbitrator with the authority to "grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just
and equitable, including but not limited to, specific performance of a contract." The AAA is an
independent arbitration association that can hear all types of claims. However, most brokerage firms
require claims to be arbitrated according to the NASD, AMEX. or NYSE Rules.
63. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1215 (1995).
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claims from arbitration." Therefore, the Court reasoned, the case came down
to what the contract said about the arbitrability of Mastrobuono's punitive
damages claim.65
The Court first looked at the standard-form Client Agreement. The two
relevant sections were: 1) that the entire agreement was governed by the laws
of the State of New York and 2) that any controversy arising out of the
transactions between the parties would be settled by arbitration in accordance
with the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the
Board of Directors for the New York Stock Exchange, and/or the American
Stock Exchange. The agreement contained no express reference to punitive
damages."
The Supreme Court followed the majority of the circuit courts and
determined that the choice-of-law provision was either a substitute for the
conflict of laws analysis or that the clause included only New York's substantive
rights and obligations, and not the state's allocation of power between courts and
arbitrators.67 The Court interpreted the arbitration provision as broad enough
to contemplate an award of punitive damages because the NASD's Code of
Arbitration Procedure indicates that arbitrators may award "damages and other
relief.168 The majority felt the provision of the NASD was sufficiently broad
to at least contemplate an award of punitive damages.69
The Court read the arbitration and choice-of-law clauses in pari materia and
reasoned the choice-of-law clause merely introduced an ambiguity into an
arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages.'" When a
court interprets such provisions in an agreement covered by the FAA, said the
Court, due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration.
71
The Court backed up its reasoning with the common-law contract interpretation
principle that a court should construe ambiguous language against the drafting
party. The majority determined the best way to harmonize the choice-of-law
provision was to read "the laws of the State of New York" to encompass the
substantive principles New York courts would apply, but not to include special
rules limiting the authority of arbitrators.72 The choice-of-law provision
covered the rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration clause covered
arbitration. Therefore, the Court concluded the choice of law provision and the
arbitration clause were independent: neither one affected the other.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Neeseman & Nelson, supra note 16.
67. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216.
68. Id. at 1217; NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 3741(e) (1993).
69. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217.
70. Id. at 1218.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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The Court explained that a New York choice-of-law provision in the
agreement "is not, in itself, an unequivocal exclusion of punitive damages."
The Court admitted there were several ways in which this contract could be read,
including one disallowing punitive damages. However, the Court chose to read
the contract to allow punitive damages in the wake of the FAA's pro-arbitration
goals.
Justice Thomas contended in his dissent that the choice-of-law provision that
had been disregarded in Mastrobuono was indistinguishable from the provision
that had been enforced in Volt.74  Justice Thomas reemphasized the Volt
principle that an agreement to arbitrate had to be enforced according to the terms
provided by the parties." Justice Thomas stated, "[t]here is no federal policy
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is
simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private
agreements to arbitrate.""6
Justice Thomas compared the two cases and noted that both parties agreed
to mandatory arbitration of all disputes." He also noted that the only difference
between the two clauses was the state specified. Otherwise, the clauses were the
same. The clause in Volt specified California law while the one at issue in
Mastrobuono specified New York law.
Justice Thomas criticized the majority for holding that the incorporation of
New York law did not need to be read so broadly as to include both substantive
and procedural law. He pointed out that this same argument had been rejected
in Volt. Justice Thomas also disagreed with the majority's determination that the
NASD rules provide for punitive damages. The NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure states:
The award shall contain the names of the parties, the name of counsel,
if any, a summary of the issues, including the type(s) of any security or
product, in controversy, the damages and other relief requested, the
damages and other relief awarded, a statement of any other issues
resolved, the names of the arbitrators, the dates the claim was filed and
the award rendered, the number and dates of hearing sessions, the
location of the hearings, and the signatures of the arbitrators concurring
in the award.78
Justice Thomas stated, "it is clear that [§] 41(e) does not define or limit the
power of arbitrators; it merely describes the form in which the arbitrators must
73. Id. at 1216.
74. Id. at 1219 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
75. Id. at 1219 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1219 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989)).
77. Id. at 1220 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 41(e) (1985).
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announce their decision."79 He reasoned the other provisions of § 41 confirm
the point. The examples he gave were § 41(a), which provides that all awards
shall be in writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators, and § 41(c), which
provides that the Director of Arbitration shall endeavor to serve a copy of the
award to the parties. Justice Thomas pointed out that the majority could not find
a provision of the NASD Code that specifically addressed punitive damages or
that spoke more generally to the types of damages arbitrators may or may not
allow. "The Code certainly does not require that arbitrators be empowered to
award punitive damages; it leaves to the parties to define the arbitrators' remedial
powers."8 Justice Thomas limited the holding of Mastrobuono to its specific
facts. He stated:
This case amounts to nothing more than a federal court applying Illinois
and New York contract law to an agreement between parties in
Illinois .... [T]he majority's interpretation ... represents only the
understanding of a single federal court regarding the requirements
imposed by state law. [T]he majority's opinion has applicability only
to this specific contract and to no other."'
IV. ANALYSIS OF MASTROBUONO
A. Subsequent Case Law
Federal courts, including the former pro-Garrity Second and Seventh
Circuits, are freely accepting the Mastrobuono holding.' The district court for
the Southern District of Indiana summed up the way courts are reading
Mastrobuono. In Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Neurosurgical Associates
of Indiana,3 the court stated:
Prior to Mastrobuono, if an arbitration dispute was governed by New
York law, the arbitrators were precluded from awarding punitive
damages pursuant to the rule set forth in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart....
79. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1220 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1223 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. The Second and Seventh Circuits had previously held that New York choice-of-law clauses
bar punitive damage awards through arbitration. See supra Section H.D and Painewebber, Inc. v.
Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996) (a choice-of-law provision will not be construed to impose
substantive restrictions on the parties' rights under the FAA, including the right to arbitrate claims
for attorney's fees); Smith Barney, Inc. v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1995) (punitive damages were
available where the arbitration agreement was identical to the one in Mastrobuono); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Masland, 878 F. Supp. 710 (M.D. Penn. 1995) (New York law was
inapplicable to the issue of arbitrability under Mastrobuono because the contract language of the
agreement is preempted by the FAA); PaineWebber v. Richardson, 1995 WL 236722 (S.D.N.Y 1995).
83. 896 F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
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The Seventh Circuit applied the Garrity Rule if the agreement to
arbitrate had a choice-of-law provision selecting New York law....
The Supreme Court overruled the Seventh Circuit in Mastrobuono and
held that choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements that
reference New York law ... cover[s] the rights and duties of the
parties, while the arbitration clause covers arbitration."
In contrast to the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Fifth Circuit does not read
Mastrobuono as expansively. In Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommuni-
cations Corp.,85 the court reversed an arbitrator's award of punitive damages. The
parties explicitly agreed that Virginia law would control any dispute;" Virginia
law does not allow a court to award punitive damages for breach of contract."
The court then held that the award of punitive damages was contrary to Virginia
law. Similarly, Louisiana does not allow punitive damages for breach of
contract.88
But while the majority of the federal courts are following Mastrobuono, the
New York state courts may not be. One recent New York case held that New York
law-specifying clauses operate to prohibit the award of punitive damages in the
underlying arbitration.89 The court distinguished Mastrobuono by reasoning that
Mastrobuono involved strong policy concerns: protecting the client who may not
realize he is waiving a punitive damages claim. The court in Trimble noted that the
plaintiff in this case was represented by counsel and voluntarily elected to pursue
arbitration under AMEX rules and should not have been surprised by the law of the
jurisdiction. The court reasoned the fairness concern for uninformed claimants was
absent and ruled that the strong public policy of the State of New York against
punitive damages in arbitration was paramount."
B. Effect on Prior Law
The holding of Mastrobuono is more far reaching than Justice Thomas
contends in his sole dissent.9' Justice Thomas concluded that the holding of the
84. Id. at 847; for more recent cases following Mastrobuono, see also Davis v. Prudential Sec.,
59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1985); Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1995).
85. 64 F.3d 993, 999 (5th Cir. 1995).
86. Id. at 999.
87. Id. at 999. See also Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., Inc., 227 Va. 154, 159, 313 S.E.2d
384, 388 (1984) (punitive damages must be predicated on tort liability).
88. Under Louisiana law, punitive damages are only allowed for damages caused to a minor
for sexual abuse and damages caused by a drunk driving accident.
89. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Trimble, 631 N.Y.S. 2d 215 (New York County, 1995); cf
In re Prudential Securities, 642 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (New York County, 1995) (court reads Mastrobuono
as controlling when there is a New York choice-of-law clause in the arbitration agreement).
90. 6 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. 179 (1995).
91. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1222 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
1996] 1027
8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
majority "represents only the understanding of a single federal court regarding
the requirements imposed by state law. As such, the majority's opinion has
applicability only to this specific contract and to no other." The reasoning in
Volt may now be limited to its facts. The Volt court had used a choice-of-law
clause to limit, indirectly, the parties' rights to arbitration.93 Mastrobuono
found a similarly indirect limitation too ambiguous to overcome the federal
policy in favor of arbitration. Unlike Volt, however, the effect of the choice-of-
law provision in Mastrobuono was to limit the parties substantive rights in the
arbitration, and not merely the timing of the arbitration as in Volt. Perhaps
minor procedural matters may continue to be subject to Volt-like choice-of-law
rules.
Moreover, at least in federal court, the Garrity Rule now appears to be
completely preempted by the FAA and, consequently, useless as a contract clause
to limit punitive damages. Because so many securities contracts contain identical
arbitration and New York choice-of-law clauses, the Mastrobuono opinion has
a far reaching impact. This impact is evident in the recent cases' following
Mastrobuono as well as other recent developments in securities law.9"
C. New Rules
In 1989, the rules of the NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASD were revised to
state that the member organizations could not use pre-dispute arbitration
agreements to limit the ability of arbitrators to make any award, including
punitive damages. 96 The SEC has approved these revised rules and construed
them to prohibit brokers from attempting to limit a customer's right to seek and
an arbitrator's right to award punitive damages. On March 22, 1995, the NASD
issued a notice to members stating customer agreements that bar punitive
damages violate Rule 21(f)(4).97 Therefore, the holding of Mastrobuono only
reinforces other mechanisms that allow arbitrators to award punitive damages.
92. Id. at 1222 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
93, Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
94. See Davis v. Prudential Sec., 59 F.3d 1186 (11 th Cir. 1995); Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d
1050 (10th Cir. 1995); Smith Barney, Inc. v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1995); Shearson Lehman
Bros., Inc. v. Neurosurgical Assoc. of Ind., 896 F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Masland, 878 F. Supp. 710 (M.D. Penn. 1995); PaineWebber v. Richardson, 1995
WL 236722 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
95. NASD Rule 21 (f)(4) and the recent proposals by the NASD, see infra Section IV.C.
96. These organizations are self-regulatory organizations (SRO's). They are responsible for
overseeing the conduct of the brokerage firms. Each has its own rules of conduct for the member
firms.
97. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Rules of Fair Practice Rule 21(f)(4), in NASD Sec.
Dealers Manual (CCH) P2171 (1994); see also New York Stock Exch., Inc., Arbitration Rules Rule
636(d), in N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) P2636(d) (1995).
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Additional safeguards against excessive or unwarranted awards may soon be
in place. In July 1994, the NASD released a report proposing several recom-
mendations for handling punitive damages awards in arbitration." Some of the
proposals are as follows:
1) punitive damage awards should set forth the legal standard applied
in awarding such damages, and the facts arbitrators found to justify such
an award;
2) decisions awarding (but not denying) punitive damages should be
appealable;
3) arbitrators' qualifications and training should be further enhanced;
4) scienter required for award of punitive damages should be standard-
ized;
5) punitive damages portion of arbitration should be bifurcated from
the remainder of arbitration proceeding;
6) caps on punitive damages should be adopted; and
7) punitive awards should be shared with state, federal, or quasi-
governmental regulators.
However, the NASD has taken no formal action on these proposals since their
release."
D. Limited Review of Arbitration Decisions
One reason why many commentators are upset over the Mastrobuono decision
is the limited judicial review of arbitration awards including punitive damages.'"
Arbitrators's unbridled discretion in awarding punitive damages causes concern.
Recent due process decisions on the issue of punitive damages in general
complicate the problem of arbitration discretion.'' Recently, the Supreme
Court held "a mathematical bright line cannot be drawn between the constitution-
ally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable"'02 level of punitive
damages. The Court upheld a $1 million award of punitive damages (more than
four times the amount of compensatory damages) as justified because it was
based on objective criteria and was subject to procedural protections including
appropriate jury instructions, a post-verdict hearing, and state supreme court
98. Neeseman & Nelson, supra note 16.
99. Id.
100. Carroll E. Neeseman, Maren E. Nelson, Securities Arbitration § 1995: Securities
Arbitration Damages, 900 PLI/Corp. 417 (1995); Constantine N. Katosoris, John F.X. Peloso, New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63 Fordham L. Rev.
1571 (1995).
101. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslp, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991); Honda Motor Co.
v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
102. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
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review. 3 In non-arbitration context, the Supreme Court has held that due
process requires judicial review of the size of punitive damage awards.' 0' The
test adopted by the Supreme Court is a "general concern of reasonableness" to
determine whether a punitive damage award is "grossly excessive."' 5
It is disturbing that the courts of appeals and district courts do not have a
similar test to review arbitration awards. Lack of a review standard is especially
problematic since the arbitrators are not required to issue reasons accompanying
an award of punitive damages, and failure to issue reasons is not reason to vacate
an award.' ° Also, the judicial review of decisions of arbitrators is limited to
the reasons set forth in § 10 of the FAA. Section 10 provides, in pertinent part:
1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them. 3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced. 4) Where the arbitrators exceed their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter was not made.'0 7
Limited review is necessary if arbitration is to serve as a quick, inexpensive
and informal means of dispute resolution.'" The interesting question that
Mastrobuono left unanswered is whether punitive damage arbitration awards will
be subject to greater scrutiny than other compensatory awards. Although
punitive damage awards in connection with securities agreements are limited to
rare instances of gross negligence or intentional misconduct, many brokerage
houses remain very concerned.
A recent United States Supreme Court case, First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan,'" held that if parties to arbitration agreed to submit the arbitrability
question itself to arbitration, the court's standard for reviewing the arbitrator's
decision as to arbitrability is the same as reviewing any other matter that parties
have agreed to arbitrate."0 The appropriate standard is to give considerable
leeway to the arbitrator and set aside his decision only in certain, narrow
103. Id. at 111.
104. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
105. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
106. Edward's & Son's, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
107. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
108. Carroll E. Neeseman & March E. Nelson, Securities Arbitration 1995: The Law of
Securities Arbitration, 899 PLI/Corp. 135, 162 (July-August 1995).
109. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
110. Id. at 1924.
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circumstances."' Thus, even after the Mastrobuono decision, the Court has
refused to expand judicial review of arbitration decisions.
It will be interesting to see if there will be a significant increase in the number
of punitive damages awards in the wake of Mastrobuono. This is a concern
because commentators and courts are reading Mastrobuono to mean that punitive
damages are an appropriate remedy."' However, Mastrobuono did not say this.
The holding was that if the parties clearly contemplated that punitive damage
awards could be awarded, the court is to enforce the contract according to its terms.
Brokerage houses may change their standard-form client agreements and omit
arbitration completely. As discussed earlier, arbitration is solely a matter of
contract. Therefore, if the brokerage houses do not include an arbitration clause,
they cannot be subject to arbitration. Fewer arbitration clauses could result in fewer
claims against these brokerage houses because many clients cannot afford the
significant costs of litigation. Therefore, the holding of Mastrobuono could do the
opposite of what the Court intended. It could result in fewer parties using
arbitration, frustrating the FAA's goals of encouraging arbitration. However, it is
unlikely that securities firms will omit arbitration clauses entirely from their client
agreements when only a small percentage of claims end in an award of punitive
damages.
E. Conclusion
The full ramifications of the Mastrobuono holding may not be seen for some
time. The Supreme Court, NASD, AMEX, and NYSE have all laid the foundation
to encourage arbitrators to award punitive damages. These organizations base their
rulings on the policy of helping the clients who have no control in the wording of
the client agreements they sign. This is in sharp contrast to Volt where the Court
based the holding on enforcing the arbitration agreement according to the terms of
the agreement. Protecting the consumer is a valid policy concern; the Court is
moving in the right direction by allowing punitive damages. However, the Court
should not swim in these treacherous waters without establishing some guidelines
on how to keep a tight reign on punitive damage awards. What Mastrobuono left
unanswered is how the Court and the securities industry are supposed to respond.
Will the Court now impose a higher degree ofjudicial review on punitive damage
awards? Will the industry establish standards justifying such awards? Will the
policy of protecting the "weaker party" spread into other areas of arbitration? Only
time will tell. Until then, the brokerage firms must ponder a future in the uncertain
world of punitive damages.
Virginia Trainor
111. Id. at 1922; the certain and narrow circumstances are set forth in § 10 of the FAA discussed
supra.
112. Neeseman & Nelson, supra note 16, at 429. See supra note 82.
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